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Title: A utilitarian perspective of social and medical 
contributions to three illustrative conditions, and recent 
UK NHS policy initiatives.  
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: 
 
Background 
 
To date debate concerning the relative merits of social and medical sciences has been 
largely academic. 
 
Aims 
 
To outline and critically appraise a utilitarian approach to mental health research that 
reflects a critical realist perspective.  
 
Method 
 
Consideration of the relative utility of differing approaches to illustrative “psychiatric” 
disorders, and recent policy initiatives. 
 
Results 
 
Socially relevant outcomes of Bipolar Affective Disorder are determined by influences that 
operate independently of the characteristic instability of mood. There is now a highly 
specific and effective psychological treatment for Panic Disorder. Its benefits are still not 
fully exploited because of continuing lay and professional focus upon the condition’s 
social manifestations. Great numbers of people presenting in primary care are unhelpfully 
caused to adopt the role of “patient” due to practices limiting the professional response 
to a medical one. Such practices reflect public and professional perceptions of the nature 
of “mental health difficulties” much more than they do the achievements of medicine. 
Recent policy-supporting initiatives influencing UK NHS mental health services are much 
more likely to be supported by social sciences than by medical research. 
 
Conclusions 
 
There is considerable scope for a contribution to applied mental health research from 
frameworks and methodologies that are rooted in a social sciences perspective. 
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INTRODUCTION: 
The relationship between Social Science and Psychiatry has been uneasy for much 
of the last half-century (Pilgrim & Rogers, 2005).  At its starkest the relationship is a 
stereotyped distinction between mechanistic approaches to individual dysfunction (the 
medical model) and a more pragmatic approach to mental health difficulties based upon 
social causes and consequences, and the lived experience of those involved (the social 
care model). Most commentaries focus upon intellectual dimensions of the distinction. 
However, the distinction also finds expression in competing, resource-determining claims 
between communities, or networks, of practitioners and investigators.  Thus the 
intellectual debate has to be informed by acknowledgment of the fact that knowledge 
itself is a socially determined phenomenon (e.g. Barnes et al., 1996; Law & Mol, 2002).  
 The sources, merits and limits of a medical approach to mental and emotional 
distress have provoked commentary and continue to do so,  In their different ways Jones 
(1972) and Scull (1989) offer historical reflections on the role psychiatry has played in 
processes mediating social segregation, and in social policy.  Amongst others, Busfield 
(1989) offers an account of ways in which this background has shaped current practices 
and there is strong evidence that the use of current mental health legislation is socially 
discriminating (Shaw et al., 2006).   
 Callahan & Berrios (2005) review the ways in which “going to the doctor” and 
obtaining a diagnosis of “depression” has become common amongst the emotionally 
distressed.  There are concerns that opinion-forming publications encouraging this may 
be influenced by sponsorship from the pharmaceutical industry (Healy & Cattell, 2003), 
and voices from within psychiatry and psychology draw attention to the shortcomings of 
a medical approach to these issues (Bentall, 2006; Bracken & Thomas, 2001; Double, 
2002).  
 Critiques of an approach to mental and/or emotional distress framed in medical 
terms can be outlined as follows; 
A utilitarian perspective 
4 
• The approach  has become dominant for a complex set of economic, historical and 
social reasons, not just because medical science has opened up a radically more 
effective set of treatments. This contrasts with other contemporaneous advances, 
such as the development of antibiotics, vaccines, or safe and effective means of 
controlling blood pressure. 
• There is often a difference between lay and professional views of psychiatry, and as 
a result it is legitimate to question the validity of a medical approach to mental and 
emotional distress.  It is openly criticised by academic and other commentators, 
especially those speaking on behalf of individual sufferers, or from a background of 
personal experience. This is in stark contrast to the unified respect commentators 
have for most other areas of medical endeavour. 
• Victims of mental and/or emotional distress, and services provided for them provoke 
ambivalent responses. “Psychiatric patients” are simultaneously pitied and regarded 
as threatening.  Reflecting their role as agencies of social control, “psychiatric 
services” are simultaneously viewed as caring and custodial. Again, this contrasts 
with public reactions to, say, sick children and paediatricians.   Rather than being 
seen as helpful, psychiatric services are considered by some users as damaging; 
indeed some refer to themselves as `survivors’. 
In the United Kingdom, present times see a growing return to concerns about the 
shortcomings of an orthodox medical approach to the needs and nature of these 
problems.  A much more consumerist approach to public services in general, and health 
care provision in particular, has encouraged mental health policy makers and 
practitioners to look again at their clients’ experiences (Department of Health 2006a).  It 
is now publicly recognised that mental health problems are a major cause of disability 
and economic dependency, and there is a search for service developments that will 
deliver more socially determined outcomes such as a return to work, personal autonomy 
and growth, reduced dependency, and personal satisfaction or “Happiness” (Layard, 
2005).  This is a major shift, no less significant than the move away from an institutional 
approach to mental health problems that began some fifty years ago, and no less 
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complex in its causes and likely consequences.  Understanding it demands an 
epistemological perspective that can accommodate such complexity.  In this paper we 
argue for the benefits of a pluralist approach to mental health research and practice, in 
particular reconciliation of the seemingly opposed but possibly complementary roles of 
medical and social science perspectives.  As others have suggested (Pilgrim & Rogers, 
2005), one such approach is critical realism. 
  
A CRITICAL REALIST/UTILITARIAN PERSPECTIVE: 
As with any set of polarised positions, competition between social science and medicine 
for the “psychological difficulties” territory reflects the partial nature of both positions.  A 
simple illustration of critical realism is the Sufi parable of blind men encountering an 
elephant, and declaring it to be “like” something similar to the part that they have 
encountered; a snake to the one who encountered the trunk, a tree to the one that 
encountered a leg and so on.  In more formal terms this is the position expounded by 
Bhaskar and others of the critical realism school (Bhaskar, 1975).  Critical realism 
maintains that there is an objectively, potentially knowable, independent reality, but at 
the same time acknowledges the constructive roles of context, perception and cognition.  
When applied to the philosophy of science this highlights how  empiricists’ focus upon 
approaches depending upon controllable phenomena that can be manipulated to produce 
particular outcomes, is only one form of observation. It does not, for instance, enable the 
study of emergent properties so central to an understanding of human behaviour and its 
vagaries (Bateson, 1972).  By acknowledging an objectively, potentially knowable reality 
as well as the constructive roles of context and cognition, critical realism meets some of 
the criticisms more absolutely constructivist approaches to knowledge present.  At the 
same time it respects the validity of differing approaches to the development of 
knowledge.  No investigator, be they a medical or a social scientist, can justifiably claim 
absolute ownership of any territory of investigation; their activities can only advance 
what is known about the subject of study from the perspective of their own 
methodologies and conceptual frameworks.   
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Within a medical framework instances of mental and/or emotional distress are classified 
using one or other of the diagnostic schemes; the International Classification of Diseases, 
ICD, or the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, DSM.  These classifications are, essentially, 
exercises in pattern recognition. They clarify the presence or absence of features 
required to fulfil certain explicit criteria. Where criteria are met, a “diagnosis” is made.  
Thus “diagnosis” is not a statement of pathological fact but an emergent property of a 
particular constellation of signs and symptoms. For instance, it is not difficult to make a 
“diagnosis” of romantic love … either as an observer or a participant.  Doing so doesn’t 
presuppose recognition of an abnormality and neither does it invalidate the myriad forms 
romantic love can take, but it does identify an emergent property with a fairly predictable 
course and consequences.  Similarly, where psychiatric “diagnosis” identifies a set of 
disabling phenomena that are known to be susceptible to a particular intervention, then it 
is a useful heuristic.     
Within a framework of social care, an instance of mental and/or emotional distress is 
likely to be considered ideographically; as a unique phenomenon reflecting the subject’s 
personal propensities, background and context.  Distress and disability are considered to 
be the direct consequence of interactions between these without reference to derived, 
higher order abstractions.  Academic endeavours reflect these differing approaches, 
broadly respecting either the classificatory, diagnostic framework of the medical tradition 
or the ideographic framework of social care.   
Exploitation of research findings in pursuit of solutions to medical and social problems is 
an applied science.  The purpose of investigation is not just the advancement of 
knowledge, but also the fulfilment of a particular set of ends.  Thus, the utility of a 
particular approach in achieving those ends is a relevant consideration.  The critical 
realist would argue that all methodologies and conceptual frameworks are equally valid 
from an epistemological perspective, and that their utility is defined by context, rather 
than by an externally referenced  hierarchy.  
From this point of view medical and social sciences have equal merit as purely academic 
endeavours, but as guides to public policy (including investment in research), utility and 
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relevance have to be taken into consideration.  Our thesis is that each research tradition 
has a contribution to make, but that their relative utility varies from condition to 
condition.  The practitioner’s perspective is different from the theorist’s, and where a 
particular set of phenomena indicate a “diagnosis” that points to an effective treatment, 
then the utilitarian advantages of a “medical” approach have to be acknowledged. With 
its origins in systems of classification that justified incarceration and its current 
susceptibilities to the pharmaceutical industry, the practice of psychiatry is probably 
unhelpfully over-committed to a diagnostic/medical approach to mental and/or emotional 
distress, and there is undoubted over-use of the diagnostic approach.  Nevertheless we 
argue that it is unduly dogmatic to dismiss it altogether. We illustrate this now by 
considering the differing contributions medical and social science have made and might 
make to each of  three commonly encountered forms of  distress.  
 
BIPOLAR AFFECTIVE DISORDER: 
“BAD” is characterised by episodes of disturbed mood. Research grounded in a bio-
medical framework has established that the disorder has a well defined phenotype which 
is readily recognisable and defined by the occurrence of repeated hypo-manic and major 
depressive episodes.  There is a significant difference between the monozygotic (70%) 
and the dizygotic (23%) twin concordance rate. Genomic linkage techniques have 
identified a link with dopamine metabolism (Barrett et al., 2003).  Dopamine is a 
neurotransmitter which is associated with appetitive and rewarding behaviour and thus a 
conceptual link to mood regulation can be made, as well as the statistical associations 
that strongly point to an inheritable contribution.   
The condition has all the characteristics of an illness and it is generally treated as such, 
with partially effective medications and a variety of adjunctive psychological therapies.  
Most cultures are quick to respond to the bipolar patient in a paternalistic way, 
committing them to hospital for treatment without consent if other less coercive 
approaches are not effective.  There is probably no other psychological condition less 
controversially considered an “illness”, and for the majority of sufferers and their carers 
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or close associates this provides an acceptable modus vivendi; but is this a full and 
adequate description? 
The older term, “Manic-Depressive” conjures up a more socially charged image and 
communicates a more social perspective.  Google’s Wikipedia lists some 65 prominent 
historical and contemporary figures who are considered Manic-depressives, including 
Frank Bruno, Winston Churchill, Charles Dickens, Jimmy Hendricks, Vivien Leigh, Spike 
Milligan, Isaac Newton and Vincent Van Gogh.  The accuracy with which these 
contemporary or post hoc diagnoses concur with ICD-10 criteria is variable, but the 
communicated image of a flawed and somewhat tragic genius is a recurrent theme. 
Furthermore the association with creativity does appear to be more than co-incidental 
(Redfield Jamison, 1993).  
Unfortunately the majority of ‘Manic-Depressives’ do not enjoy the full benefits of 
becoming a creative genius.  Suicide is many times more common than in the general 
population, and there are comparable increases in rates of marital breakdown, 
unemployment and debt.  When elated, manic-depressives commonly behave in ways 
that perturb those close to them; promiscuity, distressing extravagance, aggression 
and/or argumentative unpleasantness.  When depressed they can be un-inspiringly 
dependent, unproductive and obstructive.  Yet whether or not the condition results in  
creative genius, or obscurity, destitution and loneliness, is likely to depend much more 
upon the details of the ways in which these personal vagaries are expressed and received 
in the individual’s immediate social circle than it does upon the mood swings themselves, 
or the genetic endowment that may be responsible for them. Perhaps the therapeutic 
issue, then, should be not so much “how can the mood swings be prevented?”, but more 
“what can be done to ameliorate their social impact?”. Lithium carbonate has been used 
to stabilise mood as currently, for nearly half a century.  Whether its valuable but 
imperfect effects can be improved upon by using a different mood stabiliser is still a point 
of clinical uncertainty, justifying a major randomised controlled clinical trial (Geddes & 
Goodwin, 2001).  Thus, forty years of biomedical research may have identified some of 
the genetic underpinnings of Bipolar Affective Disorder, but they have yet to lead to 
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further advances in biomedical treatment.  From a utilitarian perspective the merits of a 
medical/diagnostic approach are limited. Therapeutic improvement is more likely to be 
advanced by approaches from the social sciences, assisting clarification of how society 
accommodates and responds to someone prone to excesses of behaviour, and what 
might be realistically done to ameliorate their consequences. Amongst others, 
contributions to this perspective are likely to come from endeavours exploring holistic 
perceptions of the individual (e.g. Tew 2002), analyses of social interaction (e.g. Bennett 
& Sani 2004) and professional/lay interactions that underpin meanings of illness (e.g. 
Maynard & Frankel 2006).  A critical realist framework argues that these have no less 
epistemological validity than bio-medical contributions, though the habitual construction 
of Bipolar Affective Disorder as an illness tends to weigh against this in practice.  
   
PANIC DISORDER: 
In formal diagnostic terms this refers to unexpected episodes of intense fear. These are 
associated with avoidance behaviour and/or frequent recourse to medical advice and 
emergency medical facilities.  Characteristically (but not exclusively) the condition afflicts 
women of childbearing years and it is associated with the “agoraphobic, housebound 
housewife”.  Under different names Panic Disorder has been recognised from the time of 
Celsius.  In men it presented a challenge to military doctors during the American Civil 
War, where it was known as Da Costa’s Syndrome, and during the First World War where 
it was known as Disorderly Action of the Heart.  There have been several physiological 
formulations of the condition, including those based upon mitral valve prolapse, lactate 
intolerance, abnormalities of vestibular and chemoreceptor mechanisms, sensitivity to 
certain peptides such as cholecystokinin, and disturbances of brain noradrenergic and 
serotonergic mechanisms (Middleton, 1998).  Panic Disorder is also one of the many so-
called neurotic conditions whose occurrence and sensitivity to treatment are associated 
with the degree of pre-morbid, formally measured neuroticism (Duggan et al 1995), 
which itself is measurably partially inherited (Sullivan & Kendler 1998), and has been 
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found to be associated with the genetic underpinnings of variances in serotonin 
transporter mechanisms (Munafo et al., 2006).  
Interest in a physiological formulation of panic disorder and earlier observations that tri-
cyclic antidepressants are of some value in its treatment have supported a 
pharmacological approach which is still is the main thrust of treatment in many circles.  
However this is not universally effective, and the last 25 years have seen a parallel 
programme of investigative research and clinical trials based upon a clear psychological 
formulation of panic disorder that informs an effective psychological treatment, Cognitive 
Behaviour Therapy or CBT (Clark, 1986).  A meta-analysis of 35 studies investigating the 
efficacy of CBT for Panic Disorder published between 1979 and 1996 has established that 
treatment based upon this framework is effective against a variety of measures (Oei et 
al., 1999).  Direct comparisons with drug treatments have been inconclusive for 
methodological reasons, but CBT is the recommended treatment in NHS settings 
(National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 2004a). 
Despite this strength of evidence and formal recommendations CBT has yet to make a 
significant impact upon levels of disability attributable to Panic Disorder.  This stands in 
stark contrast to the rapidity with which new medical treatments for peptic ulceration; 
proton pump inhibitors and antibiotics directed at Helicobacter, have been adopted over 
the same period of time.  One reason for this might be that the condition is not as 
systematically recognised as an equally common physical condition might be.   
A frequent pattern amongst young women with Panic Disorder is to become expressively 
concerned for their own safety, and make intense demands of close family.  These are 
frequently translated into a desperate and disruptive search for medical explanation and 
treatment.  The result is a chaotic and demanding family. 
In young men the condition is frequently expressed as explosive, demanding help-
seeking behaviour.  Expectations of resilience and self dependence are threatened by the 
experience of vulnerability that accompanies panic attacks.  This leads to episodic loss of 
composure, and impulsive and not uncommonly ill-judged demands for treatment.  The 
result is an angry young man. 
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The older, perhaps domestically responsible woman is likely to respond in a different 
way.  For her there are tensions between her own insecurity, and her need to support 
and provide for others.  These tend to find expression in a more secretive experience of 
panic attacks, and to the development of strategies such as the characteristic avoidance 
pattern of Agoraphobia.  They might provide a sense of mastery of the situation, but only 
at the expense of important domestic tasks such as shopping independently or providing 
school transport.  These impairments have an obvious impact upon family life and marital 
harmony.   
The older man, and perhaps the older woman whose life is not rooted in family 
responsibilities, might guard themselves from the risk of occupational disgrace by 
secretively developing reassurance-seeking strategies, such as a dependence upon 
medication, social avoidance or a highly structured routine.  In their own ways these 
bring their social costs. 
It is not immediately obvious that the clamouring, frightened teenage girl and her family; 
the angry explosive young man; the dependent, worried and scurrying housewife; the 
defensive, somewhat reclusive and rigid older man, or the forthright and apparently 
successful career woman with a bottle of valium tablets in her handbag are all suffering 
from the same condition.  It is equally unlikely that all five of them will have the same 
shared understanding of their needs and difficulties, as might be the case if all five of 
them had a broken leg.  Nevertheless careful enquiry will reveal that all three are 
primarily concerned with the fact that they suffer seemingly inexplicable paroxysms of 
overwhelming fear that threaten their wellbeing and integrity, and against which they 
have to take precautions.  The research tradition that has resulted in the most effective 
approach (CBT) to these panic attacks is one that recognises and focuses upon their 
categorical, across case similarities.  Thus, in the case of Panic Disorder there is strong 
evidence to support the utility of a medical/diagnostic framework.  Although recurrent 
panic attacks are associated with a variety of forms of social and emotional distress and 
disability, these are identifiably secondary to a specific psychological disability; an 
acquired propensity to interpret certain bodiliy sensations as life-threatening.  Panic 
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attacks are susceptible to a generic treatment based upon this formulation, and the 
sufferer is ill-served by failures to “diagnose” and treat accordingly. Here utility is best 
served by emphasising the illness model and advancing ways in which individual sufferers 
and practitioners might better recognise the remediable dysfunction, rather than focusing 
upon the social consequences with which it commonly presents and in terms of which it  
still tend to be framed. Again, a critical realist approach emphasises that formulations 
based upon ideographic social constructions of each case have no greater epistemological 
validity than the diagnostic, “underpinning disorder” perspective, which in this case offers 
a route to a strongly evidence-based treatment.  
 
PRIMARY CARE PSYCHIATRY AND THE MANAGEMENT OF DISTRESS: 
The vast majority of people with mental health problems are managed in primary care 
settings (Goldberg & Huxley, 1992).  Mental health problems make up some 30% of all 
consultations in primary care settings, and of these a high proportion are so-called sub- 
threshold disorders (Pincus et al., 1999).  What is typically meant by this is significant 
levels of subjective personal distress without associated features that enable a firm 
diagnosis or classification.  Efficacy of an intervention can only be estimated if there is 
some consistency about the condition for which it is being applied.  Diagnosis provides 
this, forming an essential underpinning of the Randomised Controlled Clinical Trial 
(RCCT).  RCCTs are meaningless without explicitly stated diagnostic criteria.  It is not 
meaningful to comment upon the effectiveness of a treatment unless it is being applied 
to an explicitly defined set of complaints and symptoms.  As the majority of so-called 
common mental health problems making up the large number managed in primary care 
settings do not meet diagnostic criteria, evidence supporting medical treatments does 
not apply.  This has been confirmed by a failure to find applicable evidence in the course 
of developing NICE Guidelines for the Management of Depression (National Institute for 
Clinical Excellence, 2004b). 
Even though there is no evidence base for medical treatment of these common 
conditions, they do present in a medical setting, where the predominant response and 
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expectations are the application of a treatment.  The selective serotonin re-uptake 
inhibitors (SSRIs) have been presented as a seemingly non-toxic medicament.  Their 
manufacturers have an understandable commercial interest in promulgating their use. 
The result has been a broadening of the use of the term “depression”, and an enabling 
effect upon the use of antidepressants (Healy & Cattell 2003).  
Callahan and Berrios (Callahan & Berrios, 2005) draw attention to the longstanding 
propensity of people to turn to the doctor when in distress.  Doctors respond to this in 
ways that reflect the Zietgeist.  Across the twentieth century a variety of tonics were 
used before antidepressants and benzodiazepines became available, benzodiazepines in 
large quantities until their potential for abuse and persisting psychological harm became 
apparent and, over the last couple of decades the (initially) seemingly harmless SSRIs.   
The experienced practitioner might privately acknowledge that prescribing a tonic, a 
benzodiazepine or an antidepressant at times of emotional distress is an act of placebo, 
but that cannot be explicitly expressed.  The recipient of such a prescription acquires the 
not-so implicit communication; that the condition they have sought help for is, 
respectively, a state of being metabolically or nutritionally run down, a state of morbid 
nervousness, or “depression”. 
Too often this is an inaccurate and unhelpful portrayal.  Causes of psychological distress, 
personal demoralisation, difficulties with decision making, or a sense of entrapment and 
powerlessness are legion.  Generally, such states are not due to a deficiency of trace 
nutrients, tranquilizers or antidepressants.  Furthermore, prescribing for them is not 
necessarily harmless, even if the medication itself is pharmacologically inert.  Prescription 
can be experienced as acknowledgement of distress on the part of the doctor, and in that 
sense potentially supportive and empowering.  On the other hand acquisition of the role 
of “patient” is intrinsically disempowering (Parsons, 1951), and as such threatens to 
undermine or distract from other approaches to the difficulty. 
General practitioners are frequently caught in this uncomfortable trap.  Doctors only 
informally carry authority as counsellor, carry no authority as spiritual advisor, and have 
relatively limited access to sources of practical support that are available to social 
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workers, financial advisers, solicitors, volunteers, child support agencies, or the police. 
Their only legitimate professional authority is based upon training and practice in the 
identifying and treatment of disease.  All too often they are faced with having to choose 
between regretfully acknowledging that they are no more able to provide help than the 
desperate patient themselves, or risking further disempowerment by defining them as 
“ill”.  
In the primary care setting the relationship between psychiatry and social sciences might 
be most usefully focused upon structural issues.  Turning to the doctor when in distress 
is understandable when there is nowhere else to go.  From a utilitarian point of view the 
enhanced suffering and disability this occasions are more likely to be alleviated by a 
better understanding of the needs and nature of those who have become overwhelmed 
by every day events, and developing more suitable ways of providing for them, than 
continuing to “diagnose”  and refine “treatment”. 
 
CRITICAL REALISM AND A UTILITARIAN PERSPECTIVE UPON RESEARCHING 
THESE CONDITIONS 
 
The orthodox medical position gives primacy to a biomedical perspective. It 
acknowledges the reality of social deficits and disabilities amongst those with mental 
health difficulties. However, it also sees them as a secondary consequence of medical 
phenomena which, if corrected, will result in their spontaneous resolution independent of 
further intervention.  Our three examples draw attention to the fact that this not so 
simple.   
The Manic-Depressive may well have that condition because they have inherited a 
particular set of genes, and that inherited propensity may well have given rise to the 
instability of mood regulation that characterises the condition.  Neither of these, alone, is 
sufficient to explain why a particular individual might be a creative genius, a dependent 
invalid, a misanthropic recluse or commit suicide.  A critical realist position reminds us 
that other perspectives and intellectual traditions have no less epistemological validity 
than the biomedical perspective. The evidence is that interventions based upon 
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biomedical research have only limited efficacy and more might accrue from closer 
attention to research grounded in a social sciences perspective.. 
Panic Disorder research has identified a psychological model which is highly specific and 
defines a psychological therapy of proven effectiveness.  Despite this, social features of 
presentation, and public and professional attitudes to psychological disorder, continue to 
exert a powerful effect upon the extent to which its potential for reducing Panic Disorder-
related disability is unlocked.  In this instance we argue in favour of the “medical” or 
“diagnostic” model which, in practice, in this condition, tends to be under-emphasised.    
Every day large numbers of people consult their GP in search of assistance with distress 
quite evidently attributable to social difficulties; the condition of undifferentiated mental 
and/or emotional distress or what we have referred to as “Primary Care Psychiatry”.  
Under these circumstances it is rarely productive to apply a medical diagnosis and 
treatment, but the socially and politically determined position of the doctor limit available 
responses, and frequently encourage potentially harmful medicalisation. In this instance 
a critical approach draws attention to the fact that conventional practice reflects the 
professional alignment of the practitioner rather than the needs of the subject . 
 
RECENT RELEVANT UK NHS POLICY DEVELOPMENTS: 
There are reassuring signs that a more pluralist and pragmatic approach to mental health 
care policy and research is developing. In the UK, 1999 saw the publication of a National 
Service Framework for Mental Health (Department of Health, 1999), and shortly after 
that, “The NHS Plan” (Department of Health, 2000).  This was a government undertaking 
to: 
• Invest in the NHS. 
• Develop a service centred around patient’s needs rather than traditions of 
provision. 
• Develop the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) to review the 
suitability of treatments made available by the NHS. 
• Integrate activities with social services providers. 
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• Extend and flex professional roles. 
• Focus expansion upon key services that impact upon common problems affecting 
large numbers of people, in particular mental health services.  
In many ways these policy developments have been re-iterated in the 2006 White 
Paper; “Our Health, Our Care, Our Say”, (Department of Health 2006a), which also 
emphasised a patient-focused direction of policy travel. 
The NSF outlined standards that should be met to address a wide range of mental health 
issues.  The investment in mental health services promised in “The NHS Plan” was made 
available against the development of additional, functionally specialised community 
mental health teams; Assertive Outreach Teams, Crisis Resolution/Home Treatment 
Teams, Early Interventions for Psychosis, and Primary Care Liaison. Prescriptive Policy 
Implementation Guidance was published and service redesign to these specifications has 
been a main priority for NHS mental health provider organisations across the country for 
the ensuing 5 years.  Investment in adult mental health services has grown by some 
20% over and above inflation (Department of Health, 2005a) and there are promising 
signs that these changes are making an impact upon outcomes (Appleby, 2004). 
These policy changes and their related service developments have been supported by 
investment in a developmental infrastructure.  Initially under the name of the National 
Institute for Mental Health in England (NIMHE), and more recently re-formed as the Care 
Services Improvement Partnership (CSIP), eight regional centres have been resourced to 
support the implementation of these and related NHS mental health policy developments. 
The national and regional activities of CSIP/NIMHE are a set of programmes which 
provide local publicity, professional peer support and information exchange intended to 
influence practitioners’ and provider organisations around a finite set of areas of service 
change, activity and development issues.  Although the full academic implications of 
these have yet to be realised, they do present a strong challenge to an exclusively 
diagnostic/medical sciences-based approach to mental health policy and practice. They 
include programmes of work focusing upon; 
 
A utilitarian perspective 
17 
Gender, Black and Minority Ethnic Groups Issues.  
It has long been recognised that minority ethnic groups, particularly Afro-Caribbean 
young men, are excessively represented amongst the psychiatric inpatient population, 
amongst those that are formally detained in mental health institutions and amongst 
those that are given high doses of sedating medication under such circumstances 
(Harrison et al., 1988, Shaw et al., 2006).  A variety of explanations have been advanced 
but it is now generally accepted (Morgan et al., 2005), that this cannot be explained on 
the basis of a truly higher rate of psychosis amongst this racial sub-group.  It has to be 
understood, at least in part, as an expression of cultural misunderstanding.  Critical 
evaluation of this demands the input of social scientists. 
The proportion of women users of mental health services is higher than raw population 
statistics would predict.  There is no reason to believe that inheritable vulnerabilities 
contributing to the risk of developing a mental health difficulty are systematically sex 
linked.  Excess incidence of mental health difficulties amongst women has to be 
understood as a reflection of gender inequalities and the patriarchal nature of society 
(Williams 2005).  There are specific issues arising from interactions between 
responsibilities for child care and mental health difficulties, the impact of physical and 
sexual abuse and occupational disempowerment that are all peculiar to women.   
Public health perspectives demand much closer attention to the needs of these seemingly 
vulnerable sub-groups.  There is need for a much more systematic research into the 
social vulnerabilities and specifics of relationships between “mental health problems” and 
social vulnerability.  For instance, the Asian community has a particular issue in the form 
of probably depressed, certainly withdrawn and isolated married women (Hussain & 
Cochrane, 2004) which has sociological rather than medical determinants (Burman et al. 
2002).  It is therefore encouraging that these are concerns currently being addressed in 
government policy from a social scientific, as well as a medical, perspective (Department 
of Health, 2002, 2005b). 
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Social Inclusion 
In 2004 the Social Exclusion unit of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister published  
“Mental Health and Social Exclusion” (Social Exclusion Unit, 2004).  The essence of the 
report was to draw attention to the fact that people with mental health difficulties 
continue to suffer stigma and discrimination, and as a result are unreasonably disabled in 
their ability to access employment, education and other elements of a socially included 
and economically productive life.  Although there is nothing new or unexpected in this 
finding, the fact that it has attracted the interest of senior policy makers is of relevance, 
and the report has stimulated Department of Health funded programmes facilitating the 
delivery of its recommendations. 
Significant amongst these are anti-stigma campaigns, attempts to address employers’ 
reluctance to employing individuals with a history of mental health difficulties, direct 
payment issues, the particular difficulties faced by local authority housing officers faced 
with the issues sometimes generated by people with mental health difficulties and the 
conundrums generated by user and carer led services.  These important areas of service 
change and development are not going to be informed by medical science but certainly 
can, and in some places are, being informed by social scientists (e.g. Wistow & 
Schneider, 2003).  
Recovery 
The traditional medical approach to mental health difficulties regards the goal of 
treatment to be resolution of symptoms, in particular improvements in symptom ratings 
or changes in the outcome of a structured interview.  Subjective accounts by people 
suffering from mental health difficulties, and other observations suggest that much more 
is involved in the restitution of someone with a mental health difficulty.  The medical 
approach to mental health difficulties explicitly identifies the sufferer as a person with 
“something wrong with them”.  Though often diligently and very well-meaningly applied, 
this approach inadvertently subverts the patient’s autonomy and sense of worth by 
continuing to describe them in such terms, and act towards them accordingly, 
maintaining the social deficits associated with the status of “psychiatric patient”.  As is 
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exemplified by successful para-athletes, “Recovery” does not necessarily depend upon 
eradication of symptoms or sources of disability.  It refers instead to a process of 
personal growth enabling reacquisition of a sense of self worth, autonomy and minimised 
dependency (Davidson & Strauss, 1992).  It is essentially a social construct relating to 
the association between self and society.  It is widely promulgated in mental health 
services in other parts of the world. The recent Department of Health review of mental 
health nursing explicitly places “Recovery” at the heart of their underpinning values 
(Department of Health, 2006b). 
Acute Care 
However carefully designed, socially aware and culturally sensitive provision of mental 
health services might be, there will be times when the assurance of personal and public 
safety mandate provision of 24 hour care and supervision.  Occasionally there will be 
inescapable instances of the need to conduct this irrespective of patients’ expressed 
wishes.  This poses particular difficulties in relation to human rights (e.g. Bartlett, 2005), 
and resonates with historical perceptions of the nature and purpose of mental health 
services.   
The current state of acute psychiatric inpatient services has been roundly criticised by 
several reports of recent years, most recently the 11th Biennial Report from the Mental 
Health Act Commission (Mental Health Act Commission, 2006).  Important criticisms are; 
a frequent lack of clarity over the purpose of admission, unsatisfactory living conditions, 
an experienced atmosphere of coercion, threat and intimidation; and a lack of 
therapeutic engagement by staff distracted by paperwork and procedural demands.  
There is undue emphasis upon risk containment at the expense of measures designed 
and intended to facilitate recovery, and restitution to a sufficiently high level of autonomy 
to permit a return to community living.   
The need to transfer an individual’s care from their community setting to a 24 hour 
facility is invariably occasioned by socially determined developments such as perceptions 
of risk and safety, public expectations, and exhaustion of formal and informal carer’s 
A utilitarian perspective 
20 
availability to provide in a less restricted setting.  From a utilitarian view of knowledge 
development this is perhaps where acute-care relevant research should be focused. 
New Ways of Working 
At the time of writing some 11% of General Adult Psychiatry posts across England are 
either vacant or occupied by expensive locums of variable ability.  
This unsatisfactory state of affairs has been explored through interviews with some 26 
incumbent psychiatrists practicing in NE England (Kennedy and Griffiths, 2001).  They 
found a wide range of approaches, reducible to a pair of stereotypes:   
• Consultant “T” (traditional) maintained a high personal caseload, felt directly 
responsible for all that happened with patients “under” them, and conducted a 
routine that included a large proportion of fixed commitments and tended to be 
demoralised and unsatisfied.  
• Consultant “N” (new) had adopted a more consultative style; distributing 
responsibility and offering advice and support to others in the multi-disciplinary 
team rather than directly intervening with patients and was more satisfied with 
their lot.   
These reflections have been echoed by others concerned that the psychiatrist’s traditional 
approach undermines and conflicts with the principles of multi-disciplinary team working.  
The result is a New Ways of Working (NWW) programme, which is focussed upon 
clarifying and enabling ways in which the various professions; Psychiatry, Nursing, Social 
Work, Psychology, Occupational Therapy and others might contribute to a 
multidisciplinary approach to service provision.  The first explicit output from that 
programme is recommendations about the role of the Consultant Psychiatrist (Royal 
College of Psychiatrists & National Institute for Mental Health (England), 2005).  This 
document challenges the traditional position of the Consultant Psychiatrist as ex officio 
team leader, manager or sapient head.  It draws into question the grounds upon which 
that assumed seniority has been based and it is challenging orthodoxies in the 
professional relationships between consultants and others.  This work, essentially 
concerning the nature, composition and conduct of multi-disciplinary teams providing 
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medical and social care has already been the subject of some social sciences research 
(Carpenter et al.,2003; Onyett et al., 1994; Paxton et al., 2003), but a full and more 
systematic investigation of the relationships between team function and therapeutic 
outcomes has yet to begin. 
Improving Access to Psychological Therapies.  
Mental health difficulties are now recognised as the single most common reason for 
absence from work due to sickness, and dependence upon Incapacity Benefit.  The 
economic implications of this have not gone unnoticed.  Lord Layard has drawn attention 
to the fact that many of the individuals so affected could be returned to economic 
productivity were there readier availability of psychological therapies supporting 
restitution of their difficulties and a return to work (Layard, 2005).  In this context the 
term “Psychological Therapies” refers to a stepped care provision of interventions, from 
simple practical support and advice through more structured, guided self-help procedures 
to formal psychological treatment, of the kind outlined for the treatment of panic disorder 
earlier in this paper. 
Although it is presented as a need to improve the nation’s health by further investing in 
healthcare provision, this development can also been seen as a major piece of welfare 
reform.  As we have argued, many of those presenting in primary care settings and 
acquiring the label (and benefits) of “mental illness” are perhaps not best served by that 
process.  Layard’s proposal addresses this by suggesting that a significant proportion of 
disability and economic dependency can be reversed by the provision, not of additional 
medical resources, but of emotional support, understanding, access to practical help and 
where appropriate, more formal psychological therapies. 
This is probably the strongest statement to date that it is not just frustrated social 
scientists, disappointed service users and a small number of dissident psychiatrists who 
feel there is much more to the research and management of so-called mental health 
difficulties than medical sciences alone can provide.  What has hampered contributions 
from outside of medicine, to date, is the polarised nature of the debate.  More often than 
not such polarisations owe more to vested interest and defensive posturing than they do 
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to a true spirit of investigation or intellectual rigour.  David Pilgrim and Anne Rogers have 
already drawn attention to the fact that from a critical realist position, multiple 
perspectives upon a particular area of enquiry reflect strengthened rather than weakened 
intellectual rigour (Pilgrim & Rogers, 2005).  That has to be particularly true in relation to 
the study and therapeutic response to emotional and/or mental distress which 
legitimately involve lived experiences, lay/community/historical perspectives and 
differing professional perspectives.  Each of these perspectives is exerted within a set of 
power relations within which the distressed subject gets caught up, and yet from a 
critical realist position, none has epistemological priority.  Best policy and practice can 
only be achieved by acknowledging this and basing choices of provision upon informed 
debate about the relative utility of each, in a given situation.      
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